e-journal

Institutions and Organizational Structure: The Case of State-Owned Corporate Pyramids

---

Pyramidal organizational structures are common throughout the world. This
article considers an explanation for pyramids built by the state: separating
firms from political interference. Although intermediate pyramidal layers insulate
managers from a pyramid’s top owners and hence induce agency costs, they
also minimize political costs of state intervention. All else equal, the optimal
division of power between the government and the managers should be the
point at which the marginal agency costs are equal to the marginal political
costs. Our empirical results, based on hand-collected data for 742 local government-
owned Chinese business groups are generally in line with this hypothesis.

---

Ketersediaan

Tidak ada salinan data

Informasi Detail

Judul Seri

The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

No. Panggil

-

Penerbit

: Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University., 2013

Deskripsi Fisik

The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 29, No. 6

Bahasa

English

ISBN/ISSN

-

Klasifikasi

-

Tipe Isi

-

Tipe Media

-

Tipe Pembawa

-

Edisi

-

Subjek

EKONOMI

Info Detail Spesifik

-

Pernyataan Tanggungjawab

agus

Versi lain/terkait

Lampiran Berkas

Komentar

---

Anda harus masuk sebelum memberikan komentar