e-journal
Scandal Enforcement at the SEC: The Arc of the Option Backdating Investigations
We study the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) enforcement decisions
in the context of the highly salient back-dating scandal. We find that (1)
the SEC shifted its mix of investigations significantly toward backdating and away
from other accounting issues; (2) event studies of stock market reactions to the
initial disclosure of backdating investigations shows that those reactions declined
over our sample period; (3) later backdating investigations are less likely to target
individuals and be accompanied by a parallel criminal investigation; (4) later
investigations were more likely to be terminated or produce no monetary penalties;
and (5) the magnitude of the option backdating accounting errors diminished
over time relative to other accounting errors that drew SEC scrutiny. Although
we cannot directly test whether the SEC substituted toward lower-stake (but more
salient) cases, the evidence presented here strongly suggests that the agency did so.
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