Communication and authority with a partially informed expert | Elibrary Perpustakaan Universitas Riau

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Communication and authority with a partially informed expert

Murali Agastya - Nama Orang; Parimal Kanti Bag - Nama Orang; Indranil Chakraborty - Nama Orang;

A sender-receiver game a la Crawford-Sobel is analyzed where the sender has expertise on some
but not all the payoff-relevant factors. This residual uncertainty can either improve (even allow
full revelation) or worsen the quality of transmitted information depending on a statistic called the
effective bias. For symmetrically distributed residual uncertainty or quadratic loss functions, (i)
the quality of information transmission is independent of the riskiness of residual uncertainty, (ii)
it may be suboptimal to allocate authority to the informed player, (iii) despite players’ preferences
being arbitrarily close, it is impossible to assert that the receiver prefers delegation over authority
or vice versa.
1.

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Informasi Detail

Judul Seri: RAND Journal of Economics
No. Panggil: -
Penerbit: Australia : University of Sydney., 2014
Deskripsi Fisik: RAND Journal of Economics Vol. 45, No. 1, Spring pp. 176–197
Bahasa: English
ISBN/ISSN: -
Klasifikasi: -
Tipe Isi: -
Tipe Media: -
Tipe Pembawa: -
Edisi: -
Subjek: KOMUNIKASI
Info Detail Spesifik: -
Pernyataan Tanggungjawab: Asmawati

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Communication and authority with a partially informed expert

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