e-journal

Help and Factionalism in Politics and Organizations

---

Whether in electoral politics or promotions within organizations, players often face the
dilemma of whether to enter the contest or to assist other candidates. This article analyzes
incentives in a rank-order tournament when the winner has control over resources that he can
distribute to his supporters. Some players may then be encouraged to help others in exchange
for paybacks, resulting in factionalism, with leaders and supporters sorted by ability. The
number and the size of factions depend on the reward structure of the contest and the
distribution of abilities. These implications are corroborated by data on U.S. gubernatorial
primary elections

---

Ketersediaan

Tidak ada salinan data

Informasi Detail

Judul Seri

Southern Economic Journal

No. Panggil

-

Penerbit

: Southern Economic Association., 2012

Deskripsi Fisik

Southern Economic Journal, 79(1), 144-160

Bahasa

English

ISBN/ISSN

-

Klasifikasi

-

Tipe Isi

-

Tipe Media

-

Tipe Pembawa

-

Edisi

-

Subjek

ADMINISTRASI

Info Detail Spesifik

-

Pernyataan Tanggungjawab

Asmawati

Versi lain/terkait

Lampiran Berkas

Komentar

---

Anda harus masuk sebelum memberikan komentar