e-journal

The Indian Parliament as an Institution of Accountability

---

Summary.
This paper examines the institutional challenges facing the Indian Parliament. It argues that
over the years there has been a decline in the effectiveness of Parliament as an institution of
accountability and oversight. It shows that the instruments that Parliament can use for
accountability—motions on the floor, oversight powers, the committee system—are increasingly
being rendered dysfunctional. The fact that the Indian economy is globalizing has also
eroded the power of Parliament in two respects. Much of economic decision making is now
increasingly governed by international treaties, and the Indian Parliament is one of the few
parliaments in the world that does not have a system of effective treaty oversight in place.
These treaties are a fait accompli by the time they come to Parliament. Second, the Indian state,
like many other states, is restructuring its regulatory framework with more powers being
delegated to non-elected institutions. This process of delegation can increase transparency and
accountability, but parliamentary oversight of these institutions remains very weak.
The weakness of the Indian Parliament has often slowed down legislation. But it has also given
the executive more powers. The authors argue that these are manifest in the increasing number
of ordinances that have been used as a substitute for legislation and weak financial oversight.
After years of wrangling, the Parliament finally passed the Fiscal Budget Responsibility and
Management Act as a means of putting financial discipline on the government. But day-to-day
parliamentary scrutiny of the executive in financial matters remains weak.
In 2002, when the Indian Parliament celebrated its fiftieth anniversary, Indian commentators
rued the palpable decline of what Jawaharlal Nehru had termed as the “majesty” of Parliament.
With much of Parliament’s time wasted on rowdiness and disorder, and theatrics replacing
debate, there are serious concerns about whether Parliament has become dysfunctional. While
“unparliamentary” behaviour by members of Parliament (MPs) has undoubtedly robbed
Parliament of the mystique that often underpins authority, the weakness of Parliament as an
institution of accountability stems from many factors, both within and outside the institution.
While India’s public institutions need wide-ranging reform, Parliament faces a daunting
challenge. First, it is increasingly becoming ineffective in providing surveillance of the executive
branch of government. The oversight function of the legislative branch of government is always
likely to be highly politicized. Parliament is, after all, a political body, which represents
constituent interests, brokers deals, and advocates views in a partisan manner. Nonetheless,
even relative to these limited expectations, one would expect the oversight function to be
stronger in an era where there is widespread disenchantment with government and resource
scarcity is acute—rather than the converse. Second, there is an ever-growing gap between the
complex demands that modern legislation places upon MPs on the one hand, and their capacity
and inclination for attending to that legislation on the other. Third, the profusion of political
parties in Parliament, most of which are institutionally weak, has substantially increased the
barriers to collective action.
But if this paper has any implications for these issues, it is to emphasize that, to a large degree,
Parliament’s inability to come to terms with these challenges is as much of its own making as
the product of any general structural changes in Indian politics, or the economy. Rather, the
Indian Parliament has self-abdicated many of its functions. For example, the authors find no
reason whatsoever, other than indifference, to explain why the committee oversight system is so
weak. They assert that Indian politics has become a lot more fractious and fragmented. In such
an environment, the imperatives of electoral and party politics give politicians great incentives
to delay important legislation just for the sake of delay. The delay in legislation does not mean
that there is better qualitative improvement in legislation. It simply means that Parliament is
more an oppositional space rather than a forum for genuine debate. There is also a growing
sense that for individual MPs, doing good work in Parliament is not linked to any politicalincentives for good parliamentary performance.
While it is true that legislation is becoming increasingly complex and demands a set of technical
skills few parliamentarians possess, much of the inattention to legislative matters is due to
Parliament’s own predilections and incentive structures. Parliament is becoming a less effective
voice on fiscal management, on the economy, on social policy and on the terms on which India
is integrating into the global economy, because of self-abdication and not because of
uncontrollable exogenous factors.
According to the authors, however, in so far as structural changes in Indian politics have led to
an adverse self-selection in who enters politics, and thereby the calibre of persons likely to enter
Parliament, one cannot be too optimistic about the capacity of Parliament to rejuvenate itself.
More important than the changes in the professional background of MPs is that those charged
with making laws may be law breakers themselves. This does not augur well for the credibility
of the Indian Parliament.

---

Ketersediaan

Tidak ada salinan data

Informasi Detail

Judul Seri

Democracy, Governance and Human Rights Programme

No. Panggil

-

Penerbit

Geneva : United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD)., 2006

Deskripsi Fisik

Democracy, Governance and Human Rights Programme Paper Number 23 January 2006

Bahasa

English

ISBN/ISSN

10208186

Klasifikasi

-

Tipe Isi

-

Tipe Media

-

Tipe Pembawa

-

Edisi

-

Subjek

ILMU SOSIAL

Info Detail Spesifik

-

Pernyataan Tanggungjawab

agus

Versi lain/terkait

Lampiran Berkas

Komentar

---

Anda harus masuk sebelum memberikan komentar