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Internal Rebellions and External Threats: A Model of Government Organizational Forms in Ancient China
Iti ancietit China, a ruler needed to handle both internal rebellions and external threats. To
decrease the possibility of internal rebellions, a ruler could organize the government to establish
the division of power among ministers. While effective in preventing internal rebellions, this
approach could make the defense of the country against external threats less effective. The tradeoff
between preventing internal rebellions and dealing with external threats in a ruler's choice of
government organizational form is affected by factors such as the size of the population, the level
of coordination efficiency, and the degree of increasing returns to the mihtary sector. If the
magnitude of external threats increases, regardless of the type of equilibrium organizational form,
the equilibrium level of the concentration of power among division heads increases.
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