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Legislator Incentives In A Fragile Democracy: Evidence From Budget Allocation In Thailand

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This article investigates if legislators in a fragile democracy share the same local benefit seeking incentives that are observed among politicians in mature democracies. Fledgling democracies are characterized by uncertainty over the survival of democratic institutions, which may discourage elected officials’ reelection effort in favor of more direct measures to gain personal payoffs. Analyses of the relationship between legislative representation and the allocation of the budget among Thailand’s 76
provinces indicate that Thai legislators are directing government expenditure to their home provinces. This result suggests that politicians’ self-serving motives play an important allocation role even in a young, fragile democracy. (

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Ketersediaan

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Informasi Detail

Judul Seri

Contemporary Economic Policy

No. Panggil

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Penerbit

: Western Economic Association International., 2011

Deskripsi Fisik

Contemporary Economic Policy Vol. 29, No. 3, 407–415

Bahasa

English

ISBN/ISSN

14657287

Klasifikasi

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Tipe Isi

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Tipe Media

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Tipe Pembawa

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Edisi

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Subjek

ADMINISTRASI

Info Detail Spesifik

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Pernyataan Tanggungjawab

Asmawati

Versi lain/terkait

Lampiran Berkas

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