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A DYNAMIC MODEL OF DOCTRINAL CHOICE
ABSTRACT
This article develops a repeated game model of the choice of doctrinal form by a higher
court. Doctrine can take any point along a continuum from more determinate, rule-like
legal commands to more flexible, standard-like directives. In deciding a case, the
Supreme Court not only decides on a substantive outcome, but also chooses where
on this continuum to set the doctrine. The lower court then applies the legal command
to future cases. In doing so, itmaywish to take into accountnewinformation, but the cost
of doing so varies with the form of the legal doctrine. The model shows that in equilibrium
doctrine ocsillates over time between more rule-like commands and more
standard-like commands. What triggers the shift in doctrinal form are the lower
court’s “mistakes” when trying to implement the standard in the way the Supreme
Court prefers. The mistakes induce the Supreme Court to cabin the lower court’s discretion
by issuing more rule-like legal commands for a certain number of periods. Too much
constraint, however, produces error costs when the lower court cannot adjust the law
appropriately to new circumstances, leading to a shift back to more standard-like doctrine.
We derive comparative statics showing how the length of the constraint phase
responds to the degree of preference conflict between the courts. Finally, we illustrate
the features of the model with the evolution of doctrine regarding the Sixth
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.
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