e-journal

AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF FACT WITNESS PAYMENT

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ABSTRACT
In this paper we discuss the disparate treatment of perceptual (‘‘fact’’) witnesses and expert witnesses in the legal system. We highlight the distinction between the perceptual act of witnessing and the act of testifying, and argue that although there might be good reasons to regulate payments to fact witnesses,
the customary prohibition on paying them for their services is not justified by reference to economic theory. We propose considering a court mediated system for compensating fact witnesses so as to encourage witnessing of legally important events.We construct a simple model of witness incentives, and simulate the effects of several possible payment mechanisms. Although it is possible that any system that offers a financial incentive will induce some unreliable witness testimony, we argue that the current system also provides incentives for biased testimony, so it is not clear that a payment system would lower the quality of witness
testimony.

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Informasi Detail

Judul Seri

Journal of Legal Analysis

No. Panggil

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Penerbit

Oxford : Oxford University Press on behalf of The John M. Olin Center for Law., 2011

Deskripsi Fisik

Spring 2011: Volume 3, Number 1, Journal of Legal Analysis

Bahasa

English

ISBN/ISSN

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Klasifikasi

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Tipe Isi

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Tipe Media

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Tipe Pembawa

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Edisi

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Subjek

HUKUM

Info Detail Spesifik

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Pernyataan Tanggungjawab

agus

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