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Bonham’s Case, Judicial Review, and the Law of Nature

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Abstract
Bonham’s Case (1610) as reported by Sir Edward Coke has often been regarded
as an early instance of judicial review of legislation. Lawyers, particularly in the
United States, have taken it as a common law precedent for permitting judges to
strike down unconstitutional statutes. Using contemporary evidence from English
and Continental legal works, this article contends that Bonham’s Case actually
rested upon then commonly accepted principles of the law of nature, and that
those principles stopped short of embracing judicial review in the modern sense.
The argument depends on establishing four points: first, that Coke accepted the
existence of natural law and used it in his own writings; second, that the facts of
Bonham’s Case lent themselves naturally to application of the law of nature to a
parliamentary act; third, that as understood at the time, natural law did not permit
judicial invalidation of statutes; and fourth, that other contemporary evidence supports
this more restrained understanding of Coke’s statements in Bonham’s Case.
In its contemporary setting, the case was therefore compatible with Parliamentary
supremacy. It well illustrates, however, one way in which the law of nature was
applied in actual litigation.

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Informasi Detail

Judul Seri

Journal of Legal Analysis

No. Panggil

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Penerbit

Oxford : Oxford University Press on behalf of The John M. Olin Center for Law., 2009

Deskripsi Fisik

Winter 2009: Volume 1, Number 1 ~ Journal of Legal Analysis

Bahasa

English

ISBN/ISSN

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Klasifikasi

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Tipe Isi

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Tipe Media

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Tipe Pembawa

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Edisi

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Subjek

HUKUM

Info Detail Spesifik

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Pernyataan Tanggungjawab

agus

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