e-journal

COMPETING MODELS OF JUDICIAL COALITION FORMATION AND CASE OUTCOME DETERMINATION

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ABSTRACT
Forming a coalition on a multi-judge panel involves an inherent trade-off between
coalition maximization and ideological outcome optimization. Much scholarship
is premised on assumptions about how judges make that trade-off; these assumptions
have consequences for how we view and measure judicial decision-making.
Specifying these assumptions, formally modeling their effects, and basing measures
of judicial behavior on these results offer the potential to improve analysis
of judicial decision-making.
This article formally explores three commonly posited modes of judicial
decision-making: a minimum winning coalition model, representing attitudinalist
views of judicial decision-making; a maximum winning coalition, capturing the
effect of norms of joint opinion writing and collegiality; and a strategic model,
incorporating the concept of the credibility of a marginal justice’s threat to defect
from a majority coalition. Each model yields comprehensive predictions of
case outcome positions and coalition sizes under given Court compositions; the
Rehnquist Court and Roberts Courts are examined here. The models are then
operationalized as measures for empirical use. The different impact of the three
measures is illustrated by re-running Baird and Jacobi’s analysis of judicial signaling
on case outcomes using each measure.

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Informasi Detail

Judul Seri

Journal of Legal Analysis

No. Panggil

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Penerbit

Oxford : Oxford University Press on behalf of The John M. Olin Center for Law., 2009

Deskripsi Fisik

Summer, 2009: Volume 1, Number 2 ~ Journal of Legal Analysis

Bahasa

English

ISBN/ISSN

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Klasifikasi

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Tipe Isi

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Tipe Media

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Tipe Pembawa

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Edisi

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Subjek

HUKUM

Info Detail Spesifik

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Pernyataan Tanggungjawab

agus

Versi lain/terkait

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