e-journal

COSTLY SCREENS AND PATENT EXAMINATION

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ABSTRACT
The United States Patent and Trademark Office has acquired a well-deserved reputation
for inefficacy and inefficiency. Proposals for reforming the patent office
have thus focused on improving the quality of patent review while decreasing
its cost. Yet this view overlooks the valuable function performed by the high
costs associated with obtaining a patent: these costs serve as an effective screen
against low-value patents. Moreover, due to asymmetries in patent values, the
costly screen is likely to select against socially harmful patents in disproportionate
numbers. Although the patent office is the most prominent forum in which this
type of costly screening operates, it is not the only one. In a variety of other contexts,
the private costs of navigating an administrative process may complement
the process itself in screening out unwanted participants.

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Ketersediaan

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Informasi Detail

Judul Seri

Journal of Legal Analysis

No. Panggil

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Penerbit

Oxford : Oxford University Press on behalf of The John M. Olin Center for Law., 2010

Deskripsi Fisik

Fall 2010: Volume 2, Number 2 ~ Journal of Legal Analysis

Bahasa

English

ISBN/ISSN

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Klasifikasi

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Tipe Isi

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Tipe Media

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Tipe Pembawa

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Edisi

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Subjek

HUKUM

Info Detail Spesifik

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Pernyataan Tanggungjawab

agus

Versi lain/terkait

Lampiran Berkas

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