e-journal
DIVIDE AND CONQUER
ABSTRACT
The maxim ‘‘divide and conquer’’ (divide et impera) is invoked frequently in
law, history, and politics, but often in a loose or undertheorized way.We suggest
that the maxim is a placeholder for a complex of ideas related by a family resemblance,
but differing in their details, mechanisms and implications. We provide
an analytic taxonomy of divide and conquer mechanisms in the settings of a
Stag Hunt Game and an indefinitely-repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma. A number of
applications are considered, including labor law, bankruptcy, constitutional design
and the separation of powers, imperialism and race relations, international law,
litigation and settlement, and antitrust law. Conditions under which divide and
conquer strategies reduce or enhance social welfare, and techniques that policy
makers can use to combat divide and conquer tactics, are also discussed.
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