e-journal

Extremism and Social Learning

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Abstract
When members of deliberating groups speak with one another, their predeliberation
tendencies often become exacerbated as their views become more extreme.
The resulting phenomenon — group polarization — has been observed in many
settings, and it bears on the actions of juries, administrative tribunals, corporate
boards, and other institutions. Polarization can result from rational Bayesian updating
by group members, but in many contexts, this rational interpretation of polarization
seems implausible. We argue that people are better seen as Credulous
Bayesians, who insufficiently adjust for idiosyncratic features of particular environments
and put excessive weight on the statements of others in situations of (1)
common sources of information; (2) highly unrepresentative group membership;
(3) statements that are made to obtain approval; and (4) statements that are
designed to manipulate. Credulous Bayesianism can produce extremism and significant
blunders — the folly of crowds. We discuss the implications of Credulous
Bayesianism for law and politics, including media policy and cognitive diversity on
administrative agencies and courts.

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Informasi Detail

Judul Seri

Journal of Legal Analysis

No. Panggil

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Penerbit

Oxford : Oxford University Press on behalf of The John M. Olin Center for Law., 2009

Deskripsi Fisik

Winter 2009: Volume 1, Number 1 ~ Journal of Legal Analysis

Bahasa

English

ISBN/ISSN

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Klasifikasi

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Tipe Isi

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Tipe Media

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Tipe Pembawa

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Edisi

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Subjek

HUKUM

Info Detail Spesifik

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Pernyataan Tanggungjawab

agus

Versi lain/terkait

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