e-journal

Many-Minds Arguments in Legal Theory

---

Abstract
Many-minds arguments claim that in some way or another, groups of decisionmakers tend to make better decisions than individuals. This essay identifies five general and recurring problems with such arguments, as follows:
(1) Whose minds? The group or population whose minds are at issue is often equivocal or ill-defined.
(2) Many minds, worse minds. The number of minds endogenously influences their quality, often for the worse. More minds can be systematically worse than fewer because of selection effects, incentives for epistemic free-riding, and emotional and social influences.
(3) Epistemic bottlenecks. The epistemic benefits of many minds are often diluted or eliminated because the structure of institutions funnels decisions through an individual decision-maker, or a small group of
decision-makers, who occupy an epistemic bottleneck or chokepoint.
(4) Many minds vs. many minds. The institutional comparisons that pervade legal theory are typically many-to-many comparisons rather than one-to-many.
(5) Many minds vs. other values. Epistemic considerations systematically trade off against other goods, such as the costs of decision-making and the expression of moral norms. The epistemic quality of the laws is a good to be optimized, not maximized.

---

Ketersediaan

Tidak ada salinan data

Informasi Detail

Judul Seri

Journal of Legal Analysis

No. Panggil

-

Penerbit

Oxford : Oxford University Press on behalf of The John M. Olin Center for Law., 2009

Deskripsi Fisik

Winter 2009: Volume 1, Number 1 ~ Journal of Legal Analysis

Bahasa

English

ISBN/ISSN

-

Klasifikasi

-

Tipe Isi

-

Tipe Media

-

Tipe Pembawa

-

Edisi

-

Subjek

HUKUM

Info Detail Spesifik

-

Pernyataan Tanggungjawab

agus

Versi lain/terkait

Lampiran Berkas

Komentar

---

Anda harus masuk sebelum memberikan komentar