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STANDING THE TEST OF TIME: THE BREADTH OF MAJORITY COALITIONS AND THE FATE OF U.S. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENTS
ABSTRACT
Should a strategic Justice assemble a broader coalition for the majority opinion than is
necessary, even if that means accommodating changes that move the opinion
away from the author’s ideal holding? If the author’s objective is to durably move the
law to his or her ideal holding, the conventional answer is no, because there is a cost and
no corresponding benefit.Weconsider whether attracting a broad majority coalition can
placate future courts. Controlling for the size of the coalition, we find that cases with
ideologically narrow coalitions are more likely to be treated negatively by later courts.
Specifically, adding either ideological breadth or a new member to the majority coalition
results in an opinion that is less likely to be overruled, criticized, or questioned by a later
court. Our findings contradict the conventional wisdom regarding the coalition-building
strategy of a rational and strategic opinion author, establishing that the author has an
incentive to go beyond the four most ideologically proximate Justices in building
a majority coalition. And because of later interpreters’ negative reactions to narrow
coalitions, the law ends up being less ideological than the Justices themselves.
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