e-journal

TENANCY IN “ANTICOMMONS”? A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF CO-OWNERSHIP

---

ABSTRACT
This article argues that a resource held in tenancy in common is likely to be underused
and underinvested, and is thus better characterized as anticommons. Nevertheless, tenancy
in common does not necessarily create tragedy, as under most legal regimes each
co-tenant has a right to petition for partition at any time, and after partition, new owners
are likely to utilize the resource more efficiently. Using data from Taiwan, this article finds
that cooperation among co-tenants does not fail as often as the literature has suggested.
In 2005–2010, at least 82.5 percent of the co-ownership partitions were conducted
through voluntary agreements, while only about 7.5 percent of the partitions were
ordered by the court. In addition, using multinomial logistic regression models, this
article finds that the court tends to order, and the plaintiffs tend to petition for, partition
by sale when partitioning in kind or partial partition would create excessively small plots.

---

Ketersediaan

Tidak ada salinan data

Informasi Detail

Judul Seri

Journal of Legal Analysis

No. Panggil

-

Penerbit

Oxford : Oxford University Press on behalf of The John M. Olin Center for Law., 2012

Deskripsi Fisik

Winter 2012: Volume 4, Number 2 ~ Journal of Legal Analysis

Bahasa

English

ISBN/ISSN

-

Klasifikasi

-

Tipe Isi

-

Tipe Media

-

Tipe Pembawa

-

Edisi

-

Subjek

HUKUM

Info Detail Spesifik

-

Pernyataan Tanggungjawab

agus

Versi lain/terkait

Lampiran Berkas

Komentar

---

Anda harus masuk sebelum memberikan komentar