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e-journal

THE LAW’S DELAY: A TEST OF THE MECHANISMS OF JUDICIAL PEER EFFECTS

Thomas J. Miles - Nama Orang;

ABSTRACT
The presence of “peer effects”—that an ideologically homogenous panel decides a
case in a more characteristically partisan way than an ideologically diverse panel—is a
standard finding in studies of appellate decision-making, but the mechanisms that
generate peer effects are not well understood. This article examines a previously
overlooked implication that the leading theories of peer effects hold for the speed of
judicial decision-making. One set of theories asserts that peer effects result from
preference-revealing interactions among judges, such as deliberation or negotiation.
These interactions are potentially time-consuming. Other theories, such as whistleblowing
and dissent aversion, claim that peer effects result from a judge’s response to existing
knowledge of her colleagues’ preferences. These responses are potentially instantaneous.
A simple prediction is that if bargaining or deliberation, rather than whistleblowing
or dissent aversion, causes peer effects, ideologically mixed panels should be slower
to render decisions than ideologically homogenous panels. The article tests this prediction
against a sample of administrative law decisions that have previously been shown
to exhibit strong peer effects. The article’s main estimates show that the ideological
diversity of a panel does not correlate with the speed of decision-making. This finding
suggests that preference-revealing interactions do not cause judicial peer effects.
But, the results show that law, specifically deference standards, influence the speed
of decision-making. A court is substantially quicker when validating rather than invalidating
an agency decision, regardless of the panel’s affinity for the substance of the
agency decision.


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Informasi Detail
Judul Seri
Journal of Legal Analysis
No. Panggil
-
Penerbit
Oxford : Oxford University Press on behalf of The John M. Olin Center for Law., 2012
Deskripsi Fisik
Winter 2012: Volume 4, Number 2 ~ Journal of Legal Analysis
Bahasa
English
ISBN/ISSN
-
Klasifikasi
-
Tipe Isi
-
Tipe Media
-
Tipe Pembawa
-
Edisi
-
Subjek
HUKUM
Info Detail Spesifik
-
Pernyataan Tanggungjawab
agus
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  • THE LAW’S DELAY: A TEST OF THE MECHANISMS OF JUDICIAL PEER EFFECTS
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