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THE PRISONERS’ (PLEA BARGAIN) DILEMMA

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ABSTRACT
How can a prosecutor, who has only limited resources, credibly threaten so many
defendants with costly and risky trials and extract plea bargains involving harsh
sentences? Had defendants refused to settle, many of them would not have been
charged or would have escaped with lenient sanctions. But such collective stonewalling
requires coordination among defendants, which is difficult if not impossible
to attain. Moreover, the prosecutor, by strategically timing and targeting her plea
offers, can create conflicts of interest among defendants, frustrating any attempt at
coordination. The substantial bargaining power of the resource-constrained prosecutor
is therefore the product of the collective action problem that plagues defendants.
This conclusion suggests that, despite the common view to the contrary, the
institution of plea bargains may not improve the well-being of defendants. Absent
the plea bargain option, many defendants would not have been charged in the first
place. Thus, we can no longer count on the fact that plea bargains are entered voluntarily
to argue that they are desirable for all parties involved.

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Informasi Detail

Judul Seri

Journal of Legal Analysis

No. Panggil

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Penerbit

Oxford : Oxford University Press on behalf of The John M. Olin Center for Law., 2009

Deskripsi Fisik

Summer, 2009: Volume 1, Number 2 ~ Journal of Legal Analysis

Bahasa

English

ISBN/ISSN

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Klasifikasi

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Tipe Isi

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Tipe Media

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Tipe Pembawa

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Edisi

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Subjek

HUKUM

Info Detail Spesifik

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Pernyataan Tanggungjawab

agus

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