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TRIAL BY BATTLE

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ABSTRACT
For over a century England’s judicial system decided land disputes by ordering
disputants’ legal representatives to bludgeon one another before an arena of
spectating citizens. The victor won the property right for his principal. The vanquished
lost his cause and, if he were unlucky, his life. People called these combats
trials by battle. This paper investigates the law and economics of trial by battle. In
a feudal world where high transaction costs confounded the Coase theorem, I
argue that trial by battle allocated disputed property rights efficiently. It did this
by allocating contested property to the higher bidder in an all-pay auction. Trial
by battle’s ‘‘auctions’’ permitted rent seeking. But they encouraged less rent seeking
than the obvious alternative: a first-price ascending-bid auction.

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Informasi Detail

Judul Seri

Journal of Legal Analysis

No. Panggil

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Penerbit

Oxford : Oxford University Press on behalf of The John M. Olin Center for Law., 2011

Deskripsi Fisik

Spring 2011: Volume 3, Number 1 ~ Journal of Legal Analysis

Bahasa

English

ISBN/ISSN

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Klasifikasi

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Tipe Isi

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Tipe Media

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Tipe Pembawa

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Edisi

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Subjek

HUKUM

Info Detail Spesifik

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Pernyataan Tanggungjawab

agus

Versi lain/terkait

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