e-journal
WHAT IS LAW? A COORDINATION MODEL OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF LEGAL ORDER
ABSTRACT
Legal philosophers have long debated the question, what is law? But few in social science
have attempted to explain the phenomenon of legal order. In this article, we build
a rational choice model of legal order in an environment that relies exclusively on
decentralized enforcement, such as we find in human societies prior to the emergence
of the nation state and inmanymodern settings.Wedemonstrate thatwecan support an
equilibrium in which wrongful behavior is effectively deterred by exclusively decentralized
enforcement, specifically collective punishment. Equilibrium is achieved by an institution
that supplies a common logic for classifying behavior as wrongful or not.
Weargue that several features ordinarily associated with legal order—such as generality,
impersonality, open process, and stability—can be explained by the incentive and
coordination problems facing collective punishment.
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