e-journal

WHY (AND WHEN) JUDGES DISSENT: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

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ABSTRACT
This paper develops and tests a model of self-interested judicial behavior to explore
the phenomenon of judicial dissents, and in particular what we call ‘‘dissent aversion,’’
which sometimes causes a judge not to dissent even when he disagrees with the
majority opinion.We examine dissent aversion using data fromboth the federal courts
of appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court. Our empirical findings are consistent with the
predictions of themodel. In the court of appeals, the frequency of dissents is negatively
related to the caseload and positively related to ideological diversity among judges in
the circuit and circuit size (i.e., the fewer the judges, the greater the collegiality costs of
dissenting and therefore, other things being equal, the fewer dissents).We also find
that dissents increase the length of majority opinions (imposing collegiality costs by
making the majority work harder) and are rarely cited either inside or outside the circuit
(reducing the value of dissenting to dissenters). In the SupremeCourt,we find that
the dissent rate is negatively related to the caseload and positively related to ideological
differences, thatmajority opinions are longer when there is a dissent, and that dissents
are rarely cited in either the courts of appeals or the Supreme Court.

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Informasi Detail

Judul Seri

Journal of Legal Analysis

No. Panggil

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Penerbit

Oxford : Oxford University Press on behalf of The John M. Olin Center for Law., 2011

Deskripsi Fisik

Spring 2011: Volume 3, Number 1 ~ Journal of Legal Analysis

Bahasa

English

ISBN/ISSN

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Klasifikasi

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Tipe Isi

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Tipe Media

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Tipe Pembawa

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Edisi

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Subjek

HUKUM

Info Detail Spesifik

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Pernyataan Tanggungjawab

agus

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