e-book
A modern approach to Graham and Dodd investing
As a child growing up in the 1960s, I always wondered what the celebrated
“Roaring” 1920s were like. This was said to be a wild and crazy
time that most adults remembered fondly, like a favorite uncle, and yet the
end of the decade had left a bad taste in everyone’s mouth, as if that uncle
had died a violent death before his time. How could such great times end
so badly?
The “bad” 1930s immediately following were a distant time in the past
to me, and yet well within the memory of many adults I knew (excluding
my parents, who, as late 1940s immigrants, did not have the American
experience of the 1930s). In contrast to the 1920s, the 1930s were a time
of economic hardship, a step backward in the unfolding of the American
dream. This was probably the least favorite decade for most people old
enough to remember it. Could such times happen again despite the increasing
sophistication of government economic policy? And were the wiser
folks right when they whispered that the depressed 1930s were the natural
result of the excesses of the 1920s, and not the fault of the government?
In the mid-1990s, I found some answers. An exciting new development
called the Internet appeared to be playing the role that radio played in the
1920s—an apparent panacea for social and economic problems that was
supposed to lead the world into a “New Era” or “New Paradigm.” The
giddy experience that resulted reminded me of what I had read of the earlier
era. The stock market was already showing signs of overvaluation by
the mid-1990s (see Chapter 18), but felt more likely to go up than down for
some time to come. This, of course, would increase the probability that
things would end badly, as they had in the 1920s. Was history repeating
itself? And would this be a coincidence or not?
This book also owes a great deal to the many years I spent at Value Line,
which shows in the large number of their reports cited here (the originals
were not reproducible). A number of individuals, former employees of the
company, and former bosses, also deserve particular mention. They include
Baby Boomers such as Daniel J. Duane, who wrote the Exxon report cited
in Chapter 7 and taught me much of what I know about the petroleum
industry and natural resources in general; Dan’s protégé, William E. Higgins,
who wrote some key sentences in the American Quasar Petroleum report
noted in Chapter 5, when I was a rookie analyst; and Marc Gerstein, who
helped shape many of my views on cash flows and balance sheets. A lawyer,
Marc once explained to me some of the legal issues discussed in the bankruptcy
and workout section in Chapter 5. He also introduced me to my
editor at Wiley, Pamela van Giessen, with whom he had worked.
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