e-journal

Knowing one’s future preferences: A correlated agent model with Bayesian updating

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We generalize two classes of statistical sequential incomplete information games: (1) those
resembling typical signaling games, in which a single agent represents each player, allowing for
information to be revealed about future play; and (2) those in which each player is represented
by a set of independent agents, where moves do not reveal private information. The generalized
model we develop, the Correlated Agent Model, relies on a parameter, ρ, which denotes the correlation
between two agents’ private information, i.e. the extent to which a player knows the future
private component of her preferences. The independent agent and single agent models are special
cases, where ρ=0 and ρ=1, respectively. The model also allows 0 < ρ < 1, a class of games which
have not yet been considered. We apply the model to crisis bargaining and demonstrate how to
estimate ρ, as well as parameters associated with utilities.

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Ketersediaan

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Informasi Detail

Judul Seri

Journal of Theoretical Politics

No. Panggil

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Penerbit

KOREA : SAGE Publications Ltd., 2014

Deskripsi Fisik

Journal of Theoretical Politics 2014, Vol 26(1) 3–34

Bahasa

English

ISBN/ISSN

DOI:10.1177/09516298

Klasifikasi

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Tipe Isi

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Tipe Media

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Tipe Pembawa

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Edisi

2014, Vol 26(1) 3–34

Subjek

Social

Info Detail Spesifik

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Pernyataan Tanggungjawab

dody/Agus

Versi lain/terkait

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