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An institutional remedy for ethnic patronage politics

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When the difference between winning and losing elections is large, elites have incentives to use
ethnicity to control access to spoils, mobilizing some citizens and excluding others. This paper
presents a new electoral mechanism, the turn-taking institution, that could move states away
from ethnically mediated patron–client politics. With this mechanism, the whole executive term
goes to a sufficiently inclusive supermajority coalition; if no coalition qualifies, major coalitions
take short, alternating turns several times before the next election. A decision-theoretic model
shows how the turn-taking institution would make it easier for mass-level actors to coordinate
on socially productive policy and policy-making processes. We argue this institution would raise
the price elites would pay to deploy and enforce exclusive ethnic markers.

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Informasi Detail

Judul Seri

Journal of Theoretical Politics

No. Panggil

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Penerbit

U.S.A : SAGE Publications Ltd., 2014

Deskripsi Fisik

Journal of Theoretical Politics 2014, Vol 26(1) 59–78

Bahasa

English

ISBN/ISSN

DOI:10.1177/09516298

Klasifikasi

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Tipe Isi

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Tipe Media

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Tipe Pembawa

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Edisi

2014, Vol 26(1) 59–78

Subjek

Social

Info Detail Spesifik

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Pernyataan Tanggungjawab

dody/Agus

Versi lain/terkait

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