e-journal

The selection and signaling effects of third-party intervention

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Although mediation is one of the most widely used conflict management techniques, not all international
conflicts involve mediation. Why do mediators intervene in some conflicts while not in
others? Do third parties strategically select cases for mediation? How does their decision to intervene
influence the outcome of international bargaining? This paper formally analyzes the initiation
of mediation and the effect of third parties’ decisions of (non-)involvement on the likelihood
of war. We find that informed mediators tend to avoid cases in which a disputant is resolute
(selection effect); however, even such self-serving actions can reduce the likelihood of warfare by
signaling the disputant’s intransigence to the other side and inducing the latter to make more
concessions during bilateral bargaining (signaling effect). The Kargil War of 1999 illustrates this
logic.

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Informasi Detail

Judul Seri

Journal of Theoretical Politics

No. Panggil

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Penerbit

Japan : SAGE Publications Ltd., 2014

Deskripsi Fisik

Journal of Theoretical Politics 2014, Vol 26(1) 135–157

Bahasa

English

ISBN/ISSN

DOI:10.1177/09516298

Klasifikasi

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Tipe Isi

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Tipe Media

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Tipe Pembawa

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Edisi

2014, Vol 26(1) 135–157

Subjek

Social

Info Detail Spesifik

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Pernyataan Tanggungjawab

dody/Agus

Versi lain/terkait

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