e-journal
Street-level charity: Beggars, donors, and welfare policies
Begging is a phenomenon that has largely been ignored by scholars of the welfare state. This is
surprising because the presence of beggars in a society tends to be interpreted as the welfare
state’s failure to adequately provide for its citizens. This paper examines the conditions under
which we expect donors to actually give money to beggars at the street level. In particular, it
offers a systematic theoretical framework for analyzing interactions between beggars and potential
donors. We develop a game theoretic model where potential donors and beggars interact with
one another in the context of a broader political environment. The contribution of our approach
is twofold. First, it offers equilibria results on the strategic considerations that motivate begging
practices. Second, it explains how social welfare policies at the macro-level can indirectly shape
the parameters that structure these street-level equilibria.
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