e-journal

Lobbying for wealth redistribution by changing the social planner’s preferences

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Wealth redistribution in a society is related to the social planner’s beliefs about social justice.
In this paper, the social planner’s preferences are described by a Choquet integral, which is a
convex combination of a weighted utilitarian social welfare function and an egalitarian social welfare
function. By spending resources on lobbying, interest groups can change the social planner’s
preferences, by shifting the weights of the utilitarian part, or by shifting more or less weight to
the egalitarian part. We use a model of a two-player lobbying game and obtain the conditions for
a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the game.

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Informasi Detail

Judul Seri

Journal of Theoretical Politics

No. Panggil

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Penerbit

China : SAGE Publications Ltd., 2014

Deskripsi Fisik

Journal of Theoretical Politics 2014, Vol 26(1) 79–92

Bahasa

English

ISBN/ISSN

DOI:10.1177/09516298

Klasifikasi

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Tipe Isi

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Tipe Media

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Tipe Pembawa

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Edisi

2014, Vol 26(1) 79–92

Subjek

Social

Info Detail Spesifik

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Pernyataan Tanggungjawab

dody/Agus

Versi lain/terkait

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