Ditapis dengan
WHY (AND WHEN) JUDGES DISSENT: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
ABSTRACT This paper develops and tests a model of self-interested judicial behavior to explore the phenomenon of judicial dissents, and in particular what we call ‘‘dissent aversion,’’ which sometimes causes a judge not to dissent even when he disagrees with the majority opinion.We examine dissent aversion using data fromboth the federal courts of appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court…
- Edisi
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- ISBN/ISSN
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- Deskripsi Fisik
- Spring 2011: Volume 3, Number 1 ~ Journal of Legal Analysis
- Judul Seri
- Journal of Legal Analysis
- No. Panggil
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RATIONAL JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR: A STATISTICAL STUDY
ABSTRACT This paper analyzes the connection between ideology and voting of judges using a large sample of court of appeals cases decided since 1925 and Supreme Court cases decided since 1937. The ideological classifications of votes (e.g., liberal or conservative) are dependent variables in our empirical analysis and the independent variables include the party of the appointing President, …
- Edisi
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- ISBN/ISSN
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- Deskripsi Fisik
- Summer, 2009: Volume 1, Number 2 ~ Journal of Legal Analysis
- Judul Seri
- Journal of Legal Analysis
- No. Panggil
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Karya Umum 
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Kesenian, Hiburan, dan Olahraga 
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